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We propose several methods for quantum key distribution
(QKD) based upon the generation and transmission of ran-
dom distributions of coherent or squeezed states, and we show
that they are are secure against individual eavesdropping at-
tacks. These protocols require that the transmission of the
optical line between Alice and Bob is larger than 50 %, but
they do not rely on “non-classical” features such as squeezing.
Their security is a direct consequence of the no-cloning theo-
rem, that limits the signal to noise ratio of possible quantum
measurements on the transmission line. Our approach can
also be used for evaluating various QKD protocols using light
with gaussian statistics.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+c
Since the experimental demonstration of quantum tele-
portation of coherent states [1], a lot of interest has arisen
in continuous variable quantum information processing.
In particular, a stimulating question is whether quan-
tum continuous variables (QCV) may provide a valid
alternative to the usual “single photon” quantum key
distribution schemes [2]. Most present proposals to use
QCV for QKD [3–15]. are based upon the use of “non-
classical” light beams, such as squeezed light, or pairs of
light beams that are correlated for two different quadra-
tures components (the so-called “EPR” beams, by anal-
ogy with the historical paper by Einstein, Podolski and
Rosen [16]). But recent work on this subject [17] under-
lined the crucial importance of the continuous variable
version of the no-cloning theorem [18], as soon as secu-
rity is concerned in any exchange using QCV.
In this letter, we show that there is actually no need
for squeezed light : an equivalent level of security may be
obtained by simply generating and transmitting random
distributions of coherent states. The security of this novel
protocols is related to the no-cloning theorem, that lim-
its possible eavesdropping even though the transmitted
light has no “non-classical” feature such as squeezing. We
show that our analysis can be also applied to other pro-
tocols using light with gaussian statistics, i.e. squeezed
or EPR beams, making thus the comparison easier. The
basic tools for this analysis are the ones that have been
extensively used for linearized quantum optics, includ-
ing in particular optical quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurements [19]. Before presenting our protocol, we
will briefly review the current literature on continuous
variables QKD.
Here we consider security against individual attacks
only, and we do not address the issue of uncondition-
nal security, that was demonstrated by Gottesman and
Preskill [3] for squeezed states protocols (unconditional
security of coherent states protocols remains an open
question). Security against individual attacks was pre-
viously considered by many authors. Hillery proposed a
QKD scheme based on binary modulated squeezed light
[4]. Cerf et al showed it could be improved considering
gaussian modulation [5,6] and described a reconciliation
protocol [6,7] to implement this improved protocol. In
the present work we will generalize this approach to the
various single beam protocols of the litterature [4–12].
The protocol described in [5,6] is then a particular mem-
ber of the family of protocols described here. EPR beams
were also considered for QKD schemes. Some schemes
need the propagation of one beam only from Alice to Bob
[9–14], the other half of the EPR pair being measured
by Alice, whereas others need the propagation of two
modes (or more) of the electromagnetical field [8,13–15].
In the first family, Reid [10] and Ralph [9] consider “bi-
nary” modulated EPR beams, created by a parametric
amplifier with a modulated seed [10] or interfering modu-
lated squeezed beams [9], whereas Silberhorn et al [11,13]
and Navez et al [12] extract their key from correlated
measurement sequences. As we will show below, these
schemes can be viewed as the transmission of a modu-
lated sub-shotnoise beam. Bencheikh et al [14] extract
the binary key directly from the gaussian correlations.
This extraction can be optimized using the reconciliation
protocol described in [6,7]. The protocols transmitting
several quantum-correlated modes of the electromagnetic
field, using two beams [8,13–15] are beyond the scope of
this letter, because their security analysis should take
into account simultaneous attack on both modes. How-
ever, similar gaussian extension of these protocols seem
possible. Finally, Ralph examined a binary modulated
coherent beam protocol [8,9], and showed its need for pri-
vacy amplification [20]. Here we will introduce a family
of gaussian protocols, and we will show that the coherent
state version is secure and as efficient as the correspond-
ing squeezed light or EPR protocols.
General principle of the protocols. The QKD protocols
we study here are single gaussian beam protocols. Alice
modulate randomly a gaussian beam and send it to Bob
through a gaussian noisy channel. Both phase and am-
plitude are modulated with gaussian random numbers,
since it allows an optimal information rate [21]. Bob
then measures either the phase or the amplitude of this
beam and informs Alice which measurement he made.
Bob and Alice have then two correlated sets of gaussian
variables, from which they can extract a common secret
string of bits as explained below.
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The basic tool that we will use is the Shannon formula
giving the optimum information rate I of a noisy trans-
mission channel, in units of bits/symbol [21]. If the noise
is white and gaussian and the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
is Σ, this optimum information rate is
IAB = 1/2 log2(1 + Σ). (1)
Since this optimum can be closely approached only if the
signal has a gaussian statistics [21], we will consider only
gaussian modulation protocols, and use (1) to calculate
the amount of private information that Alice and Bob
may exchange in presence of the eavesdropper Eve.
The sliced reconciliation protocol described in detail in
[6,7] and briefly sketched in the Appendix allows us to
get arbitrarly close to the value given by (1). For secu-
rity purposes, one must assume that Eve has an arbitrary
powerful computer, and thus she is able to reach this
limit. In case Alice and Bob are not, they will have to al-
low for an extra security margin (see Discussion below).
We note that it is not required to specify a “digitizing
step” to connect the continuous variable and a bit value:
the bits will appear at the end of the reconciliation pro-
tocol [6,7]. At this stage, Alice and Bob share a string
of bits which is partly known by Eve. They can then use
standard privacy amplification protocol [23] to agree on
a secret key. The rate at which this secret key can be
constructed is
∆I = IAB − IAE , (2)
where IAB (IAE) is the information rate between Alice
and Bob (Eve).
Eavesdropping. The IAB term of (2) is easy to com-
pute for a given scheme, the signal to noise ratio ΣB
being known. We have to assume IAE being the maxi-
mum possible given the laws of physics (considering only
individual attacks, coherent attacks are beyond the scope
of this letter). If the protocols are globally invariant un-
der the exchange of the two quadratures X and P , the
best tactic for Eve is to keep this property in her attacks.
Therefore, we can restrict us to attacks that treat equally
both quadrature without loss of generality.
Given these hypothesis, we will use a general result,
that is demonstrated in [17] : if the added noise on Bob’s
side is χN0, where N0 is the vacuum noise variance, then
the minimum added noise on Eve’s side is χ−1N0. This
applies to both quadratures, and the added noise may
be due to line losses, eavesdropping, or any other reason
[17]. Since the demonstration of ref. [17] is just another
form of the no-cloning theorem, it also adresses any indi-
vidual attack by Eve using a cloning machine [18]. When
the line has a transmission η with no Eve present, one
has χ = (1−η)/η. The best attack for Eve is then to take
a fraction 1 − η of the beam at Alice’s site, and to send
the fraction η to Bob through her own lossless line (that
may be a perfect teleporter). Eve is then totally unde-
tected, and she gets the maximum possible information
according to the no-cloning theorem.
Equation (2) shows that these protocols are secure as
long as Bob has a more in formation on Alice’s key el-
ement than Eve, i.e. as long as IAB > IAE . Since the
Shannon formula (1) is valid for both Bob and Eve, the
security condition is just a condition on the signal to
noise ratios, which turns to be a condition on the added
noises, since the signal and the noise added at Alice’s side
(quantum noise, Alice’s technical noises) are the same.
∆I > 0 ⇔ ΣB > ΣE ⇔ χ < 1 (3)
Since χ = (1 − η)/η for a line with transmission η, the
condition χ < 1 requires that η > 1/2. Therefore, a
usable key can be obtained in principle as soon as the
transmission losses are less 3dB. Taking into account the
standard loss of 0.2dB/km in optical fibers at 1550 nm,
the typical range would be around 10 km.
In this security evaluation, the noise added in Alice’s
side cancels out because it disturbs equally Eve and Bob.
This ‘cancelled’ noise includes the quantum noise of the
beam. As a consequence, the security of these protocols
relies of the quantum aspects of measuring or copying,
but not on any quantum feature of the beam, like squeez-
ing or entanglement. We can do quantum cryptography
with coherent beams, as mentionned by Ralph [8,9] or
even with highly noisy beams. Quantum features of the
beams might influence some characteristics of the pro-
tocol like the secret key rate or the amount of classical
communication needed to agree on the secret key, but
not its security.
Coherent Beam protocol. Let us now explicitly describe
the coherent beam protocols of this family:
1. Alice draws two random numbers xA and pA from
a gaussian law with variance VAN0
2. She sends to Bob the coherent state |xA + ipA〉
3. Bob randomly chooses to measure either X or P .
This measurement can be done perfectly.
4. Using a classical public channel he informs Alice
about the observable that he measured (like in the BB84
protocol, half of the key generated by Alice is unused)
5. Alice and Bob share two correlated gaussian vari-
ables. Then they may use the “sliced reconciliation” pro-
tocol [7,6] to transform it into errorless bit strings. Fi-
nally, they have to use a standard protocol for privacy
amplification [23] in order to distill the private key.
According to eq. (1), the channel rate ∆I for the pri-
vate key will be:
∆I = 12 log2(1 + ΣB)− 12 log2(1 + ΣE) (4)
The total variance of any quadrature of the beam when
it leaves Alice’s realm is V N0 = VAN0 + N0. Using the
expressions 1 + ΣB =
V+χ
1+χ , and 1 + ΣE =
V+1/χ
1+1/χ , the
useful secret information rate is :
∆I = 12 log2
V+χ
1+V χ (5)
If χ < 1, ∆I will increase as a function of the signal
modulation VA. For large modulation (χV ≫ 1), the
asymptotic value of ∆I is :
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∆Iasymp = − 12 log2 χ = 12 log2 η1−η (6)
while the raw channel rate between Alice and Bob is
IAB =
1
2 log2(V/(1 + χ)).
Squeezed state protocol. This protocol can straightfor-
wardly be generalized to modulated squeezed beam, with
a squeezing factor s < 1. The protocol becomes :
1. Alice chooses randomly if the beam is squeezed in
X or P (for instance we will later assume the beam being
X-squeezed). Let denote |ψ〉 this squeezed state.
2. Alice draws two random numbers xA and pA from
two gaussian laws with variances VxAN0 and VpAN0. The
two squeezed direction are indistinguishable for Eve iff
VxAN0 + sN0 = VpAN0 +
1
sN0 ≡ V N0 (7)
3. Alice sends to Bob the displaced squeezed state
D(xA + ipa) |ψ〉
4. Bob randomly chooses to measure either X or P .
5. Using a public channel, Alice and Bob inform each
other about the squeezing direction and the measured
observable.
6. Like with coherent states Alice and Bob share cor-
related gaussian variables, from which they can extract
a private binary key.
This protocol obviously reduces to the protocol de-
scribed above if s = 1. Another limit, where VpA = 0
or V = 1/s, is the protocol described by Cerf et al in
[5,6]. In this case, information is gathered for the key
only when Bob makes the right guess.
To compute the private rate ∆I, we will average be-
tween the right guesses and the wrong guesses :
∆I = 12 [(IABX − IAEX) + (IABP − IAEP )] (8)
= 14 log2
(1+ΣBX )(1+ΣBP )
(1+ΣEX )(1+ΣEP )
(9)
We have ΣBX =
VxA
s+χ =
V−s
s+χ and 1 + ΣBX =
V+χ
s+χ .
The three other signal to noise ratios are obtained by
replacing χ or/and s by χ−1 or s−1. Therefore,
IAB =
1
4 log2
(V+χ)2
χ − 14 log2(χ+ 1χ + s+ 1s ) (10)
IAE =
1
4 log2
(V+1/χ)2
1/χ − 14 log2(χ+ 1χ + s+ 1s ) (11)
Since the s-dependent term of these information rates
are the same, they cancel each other in ∆I. The secret
information rate is thus again given by eq. (5), and does
not depend on the degree of squeezing.
Extension to EPR case. The previous description does
not apply directly on EPR protocols. However, an EPR
QKD protocol where Alice keeps one of the beams and
sends the other to Bob is logically equivalent to a ran-
domly modulated beam with a sub-shot noise quantum
variance. Let note XA the quadrature Alice measures
and Xout the same quadrature of the beam sent to Bob
when it leaves Alice’s lab. For a standard non-modulated
EPR scheme [11] we have the following relations :
〈
X2A
〉
=
〈
X2out
〉 ≡ V = (s+ 1/s)/2 (12)
〈
(XA −Xout)2
〉
= 2s (13)
〈XAXout〉 = V − s (14)
We can separate Bob’s beams in two parts, that are re-
spectively correlated and uncorrelated with Alice’s mea-
surement, by writingXout = gXA+N where 〈XAN〉 = 0.
Bob’s beam is then equivalent to a beam with quantum
noise
〈
N2
〉
on quadrature X , which is randomly modu-
lated with the variable gXA. Using eqs (12,14) one gets:
g = 1− s/V = (1− s2)/(1 + s2) (15)
〈
N2
〉
= s(2− s/V ) = 2s/(1 + s2). (16)
These equations describe the case where Alice and Bob
measure the same quadrature. When Alice changes her
quadrature, while Bob keeps the same measurement, the
initial wave packet is reduced onto a noisy quadrature,
and no useful correlation is generated. On the average,
the information rate is therefore half of the “equivalent”
modulation scheme. Using (12), we have then:
1 + ΣB = 1 +
g2V
〈N2〉+χ =
V (V+χ)
1+χV (17)
∆I = 14 log2(
V+χ
1+χV
1+V/χ
V+1/χ) =
1
2 log2(
V+χ
1+χV ) (18)
This value of ∆I is again just the same as the coherent
state result (5) for given χ and V , so that s is defined
by (12). Adding excess noise or a modulation on the
outgoing beam brings no further improvement.
Discussion. Various comments are in order. First, it
appears that non classical features like squeezing or EPR
correlations have no influence on the achievable secret key
rate for the family of protocols that were described here.
This result may not apply to all possible protocols, e.g. ,
we did not consider using a continuous quantum memory.
On the other hand, since the raw information rate are dif-
ferent for the same secret key rate, squeezed beams can
be used to save classical communications during the pri-
vacy amplification procedure. The EPR beams have also
the advantage of directly providing quantum-generated
gaussian noise, rather than having it externally generated
by Alice. More importantly, entanglement, that is not di-
rectly used in the present protocols, can be useful to beat
the 3 dB limit by using more than one beam. Though the
3 dB loss limit of our cryptography protocols makes their
security demonstration quite intuitive, there exist multi-
ples ways for Alice and Bob to go beyond this limit. The
most radical way is to send many EPR beams through
the noisy channel, then to use entanglement purification
[22] to build stored entanglement between Alice and Bob,
and finally to implement a high fidelity teleporter. For
any finite value of the losses and EPR entanglement, an
arbitrarily high fidelity can be achieved [22]. The no-
cloning theorem ensures the security of these schemes
as soon as the fidelity of the teleporter is above 2/3 [17],
which is equivalent to the 3 dB loss limit discussed above.
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In some sense, a “lossless” line is re-created by using en-
tanglement purification. There may exist more realistic
ways to cross the 3 dB barrier. For instance, Alice and
Bob may “invert” the reconciliation procedure, with Al-
ice guessing Bob’s measurement instead of Bob guessing
Alice’s value [23]. This inverted procedure may be more
efficient, but its complete security analysis is beyond the
scope of this letter.
On the practical side, one should note that Bob’s detec-
tors are not ideal, but have a non-zero electronic noiseB0,
that should be much smaller than N0, and a maximum
(saturation) input power σB0 ≫ N0, where σ ≫ 1 is the
detector’s dynamics. Taking into account these charac-
teristics in the simplest coherent state protocol gives an
optimum value of the signal variance, VA ∼
√
σ. An-
other point is that Alice and Bob may not be able to
achieve the Shannon limit (1), due to limited comput-
ing power (no such limitation is relevant for Eve). As-
suming that the effective information rate between Alice
and Bob is reduced by a factor α < 1, the net secret
rate becomes ∆Ieff = αIAB − IAE , and remains posi-
tive if α > IAE/IAB. The quantity ∆Ieff is plotted on
Fig.1 for α = 1 (full lines), and for various values of α
that are arbitrarily associated with various values of the
SNR (dashed lines). It is clear from that figure that low
values of α reduce the transmission range in which the
protocol is secure. We note that according to [6,7], the
sliced reconciliation protocol should yield α ∼ 1 (see also
Appendix), but this may be costly in terms of calcula-
tion time and public channel transmissions. All these
constraints should eventually be taken into account to
choose the most appropriate value of VA.
As a conclusion, it is possible to design a QKD scheme
with coherent states, secure against any individual at-
tack, by using optimized reconciliation protocols and
privacy amplification. Since the protocol does not re-
quire squeezing, it can be implemented by sending light
pulses in a low-loss optical fiber, like in a coherent optical
telecommunication scheme. In that case, all pulses will
be useful, but half of the random numbers generated by
Alice will not be used. We demonstrated that the pro-
tocol is asymptotically secure [7] for losses smaller than
3dB (or a teleportation fidelity larger than 2/3 [17]), and
the net information rate for the private key with a large
signal modulation is 1/2 log2(1/χ) = 1/2 log2(η/(1− η)).
Appendix : Sliced reconciliation protocol
In the n-slice version of the reconciliation protocol pro-
posed in ref. [7], the real axis representing the amplitude
of the signal is split in 2n intervals s1 =]−∞, −t1], s2 =
] − t1, −t2], ... s2n =]t2n−1, +∞[, where tp = −t2n−p,
and t2n−1 = 0. Alice assigns an amount of n bits to
an amplitude that lies in the interval sp, by using the
parity of p for bit 1, of Floor(p/2) for bit 2, ... , and
of Floor(p/2n−1) for bit n. After receiving the data,
Bob makes an optimized guess of the first bit value us-
ing appropriate weighting functions, that are computed
by optimizing the choice of the {tp} (this optimization
is made only once, before exchanging the data). After a
first correction round by exchanging public data between
Alice and Bob, Bob knows the correct value of the first
bit. Then he tries to guess the second bit, with a much
higher probability of success, because he already knows
the first one. By increasing both the SNR Σ and the
number of slices, the process gets more and more effi-
cient, keeping the same main idea : after each correction
round, Bob can guess the next bit with a higher proba-
bility. For the 5-slice protocol with Σ = 15 presented in
[7], the probabilities of guessing right for slices 4 and 5
are respectively 0.976 and 0.999994, and the efficiency is
more than 90% of the Shannon limit 12 log2(16) = 2.
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FIG. 1. Private channel information rate ∆I as a function
of the channel noise χ. The three curves in full lines corre-
spond to VA = 1, 5, 50 from the bottom to the top, assum-
ing that the reconciliation protocol between Alice and Bob
reaches the Shannon limit. The three curves in dashed lines
correspond to the effective ∆I with the sames values of VA,
with (arbitrarily chosen) reconciliation efficiencies α that are
respectively 0.6, 0.8 and 0.95 of the Shannon limit.
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